Many theories of the effects of attitudes on memory for attitude-relevant information would predict that attitudinally congenial information should be more memorable than uncongenial information. Yet, this meta-analysis showed that this congeniality effect is inconsistent across the experiments in this research literature and small when these effects are aggregated. The tendency of the congeniality effect to decrease over the years spanned by this literature appeared to reflect the weaker methods used in the earlier studies. The effect was stronger in 2 kinds of earlier experiments that may be tinged with artifact: those in which the coding of recall measures was not known to be blind and those that used recognition measures that were not corrected for bias. Nonetheless, several additional characteristics of the studies moderated the congeniality effect and suggested that both attitude structure and motivation to process attitude-relevant information are relevant to understanding the conditions under which people have superior memory for attitudinally congenial or uncongenial information. Do attitudes exert a causal impact on what people learn and remember? Historically, psychologists have proposed a congeniality effect on memory-the hypothesis that people have better memory for information that supports, confirms, or reinforces their evaluations of social, political, and personal issues than for information that undermines or challenges these attitudes. This issue of whether attitudes influence memory has endured since the beginning of experimental research in social psychology. It is as central to contemporary research on attitudes and social cognition (see Eagly, 1992; Eagly & Chaiken, 1993) as it was to the "new look" perspective of the late 1940s, which held that psychological states such as expectancies, schemas, values, affect, and attitudes exert selective effects at all stages of information processing (e.g., Bruner & Goodman, 1947; see also Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Olson, Roese, & Zanna, 1996) . Moreover, well before the "new look," Alice H. Eagly, Department of Psychology, Northwestern University; Serena Chen, Department of Psychology, University of Michigan; Shelly Chaiken, Department of Psychology, New York University; Kelly ShawBarnes, Department of Psychology, Purdue University.
prominent philosopher-scientists such as William James (1890 James ( / 1952 and Sigmund Freud (1938) expressed the idea that attitudes bias information processing in a manner that favors attitudinally congruent information. The first attitude theorists accepted this idea (e.g., Allport, 1935) , and early textbook writers featured attitudinal selectivity as a basic principle of social psychology (e.g., Asch, 1952) .
Early attitude theorists were correct in recognizing the importance of understanding attitudes' effects on memory. Such understanding should illuminate the broader issue of attitudinal selectivity in information processing because selective memory may be mediated at least in part by selective effects at earlier processing stages (e.g., attention, encoding). In addition, research on selective memory should inform theory concerning the persistence of attitudes and their resistance to change because both persistence and resistance should be heightened by prior information processing that favors attitudinally congruent material and ignores or refutes incongruent material.
A Brief History of Attitude Memory Research
In the modal study of the impact of attitudes on memory, participants indicate their attitudes on a questionnaire and subsequently receive information that is evaluatively consistent or inconsistent with their attitudes. Memory measures, most commonly free recall of the information, are then administered. The history of such research has been far less coherent than early intuitions and theorizing suggested. Some initial experiments seemed to provide strong support for the congeniality effect (e.g., A. L. Edwards, 1941a; Levine & Murphy, 1943) . Most influential was Levine and Murphy's study, in which 5 procommunist and 5 anticommunist participants read and then tried to recall both a procommunist message and an anticommunist message on five different learning trials and then attempted to recall these messages on five subse-quent forgetting trials. On each trial, procommunists recalled more of the procommunist message than anticommunists, and anticommunists recalled more of the anticommunist message than procommunists.
The conceptual replications of Levine and Murphy's (1943) experiment that were reported during the 1950s produced findings that were generally weaker and less consistent within studies (e.g., Mannello, 1954; Paulson, 1954) . Additional findings of this era suggested that variables such as the utility and plausibility of information could moderate attitudes' impact on memory (Jones & Aneshansel, 1956; Jones & Kohler, 1958) . Nonetheless, a statement published in the 1962 behavioral sciences report to the President's Science Advisory Committee conveyed strong views about the effects of attitudes on information processing (Behavioral Sciences Subpanel, 1962) :
Individuals engage in selective exposure and selective perception. Those least predisposed to change are least likely to allow themselves to be exposed to a persuasive communication, and if they are exposed, are most likely to engage in misperception, a kind of motivated missing-the-point. If a new piece of information would weaken the existing structure of their ideas and emotions, it will be shunned, rejected, or quickly forgotten; if it reinforces the structure, it will be sought out, quickly accepted, and remembered, (p. 277) This statement, prepared by a group of eminent behavioral scientists, promoted classic ideas about attitude selectivity, including the underlying assumption that people are motivated to defend their attitudes. This reasoning included the principle that this defense could take place at one or more stages of information processing. Initially, people may avoid exposure to uncongenial information. Even if they are exposed to uncongenial information, they may nonetheless give it little attention. Moreover, they may distort its meaning so that its impact is blunted. Even if people correctly encode uncongenial information, they may dismiss it as invalid. All of these defensive processes could compromise memory for uncongenial information.
The 1962 report from the President's Science Advisory Committee represented the zenith of social psychologists' belief in the attitude congeniality hypothesis (Behavioral Sciences Subpanel, 1962) . The nadir appeared only a few years later. Many studies published during the 1960s failed to find support for the congeniality hypothesis (e.g., Brigham & Cook, 1969; Fitzgerald & Ausubel, 1963; Greenwald & Sakumura, 1967; Waly & Cook, 1966) , and the results of other studies were ambiguous (e.g., Malpass, 1969; Smith & Jamieson, 1972) . The null results in particular were accompanied by a growing perception that the previous two decades had produced fragile congeniality effects that were less attributable to the true impact of attitudes on memory than to methodological deficiencies, such as a possible tendency for congenial information to be more familiar than uncongenial information. By the mid-1970s, consensus opinion fully reversed the early belief in the congeniality effect. For example, Greaves (1972) described selective memory research as "unambiguously inconclusive" (p. 327), and Greenwald (1975) portrayed it as consisting of a few early confirmations of the attitude congeniality hypothesis and a larger number of more carefully executed failures to replicate the phenomenon. Other reviewers of the attitudes literature concurred (e.g., Fishbein & Ajzen, 1972) , and treatments of the attitude-memory relation receded in advanced and elementary textbooks. These doubts were compounded by Freedman and Scare's (1965) questioning of support for another important attitudinal selectivity hypothesis: selective exposure to information. Yet, despite this discouraging environment, experiments on attitude memory continued to be published in psychological journals (e.g., Furnham & Proctor, 1990; Hymes, 1986; Read & Rosson, 1982) , albeit with decreasing frequency.
The apparent inconsistencies in the findings of experiments testing the congeniality hypothesis and prominent challenges to the existence of any relation between attitudes and memory thus raised serious questions about the validity of the congeniality hypothesis. In an effort to address these issues in a meta-analytic review, Roberts (1985) obtained a small-to-moderate tendency for people to remember attitude-congruent information better than attitudeincongruent information, as indicated by his mean effect size of 0.36 in the d metric. However, Roberts's incomplete sampling of the literature and inclusion of some studies with inadequate experimental designs cast doubt on his conclusions. Moreover, he examined few of the numerous potential moderators of the congeniality effect, although he did find a larger effect for experiments' delayed measures than their immediate measures and for experiments conducted at earlier than later dates. Given the limitations of Roberts's review as well as the inconsistency of his conclusions with prior claims that the congeniality effect is probably null (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1972; Greenwald, 1975) , a comprehensive quantitative synthesis of attitude memory research is long overdue. We thus conducted such a meta-analysis and designed it not only to examine the empirical robustness of the congeniality effect but also to illuminate a variety of theoretical and methodological issues relevant to understanding attitudes' effects on memory.
Theoretical Analysis of the Impact of Attitudes on Memory
Understanding the attitude-memory relation requkes taking into account processes that may mediate this relation and variables that may moderate it. In the background of our analysis of underlying processes is traditional reasoning by attitude theorists that people are motivated to defend their attitudes and that defense-motivated processing often gives rise to superior memory for congenial information. This reasoning suggests that memory for incongruent information can be poor because people avoid, distort, or repress such information (e.g., Festinger, 1957 Festinger, , 1964 Freud, 1938 ). Yet, neglected in these motivational analyses promoted by early theorists are the cognitive mechanisms that may play a role in attitudes' influence on memory. Most notably, to the extent that people's attitudes and associated beliefs constitute schemas that affect information processing, the poor fit of uncongenial information to attitudinal structures may inhibit its learning and retrieval. Structural aspects of attitudes may play an even larger role as the time increases between learning information and responding to memory measures. For example, as time goes by, reconstruction processes may increasingly rely on attitude structure to fill in gaps in memory for previously presented information (Bartlett, 1932) . Therefore, in planning our synthesis, we took into account both cognitive and motivational mechanisms but developed more complex assumptions about these mechanisms than had earlier attitude theorists.
First, we consider the cognitive mechanisms that may affect the attitude-memory relation. The idea that uncongenial information has a poor fit to attitudinal knowledge structures is too simple, because it assumes that these structures are necessarily unipolar, in the sense that they represent mainly attitude-consistent information. Attitudinal knowledge structures likely are well supplied with beliefs supportive of one's attitude (e.g., Feather, 1970) , which should serve as retrieval cues for remembering congenial information and thus should promote memory for such information. However, as Pratkanis (1984 Pratkanis ( /1985 Pratkanis ( , 1989 suggested, if people are attitudinally bipolar in the sense that they are at least familiar with arguments that oppose their attitudes, uncongenial information may be as strongly linked to their attitudes as is congenial information. Pratkanis's data suggested that bipolar structures are common for controversial social issues such as abortion, whereas unipolar structures may be common for a variety of other topics such as sports and music, for which people have little knowledge of arguments that oppose their attitudes. Despite the fact that people with bipolar structures ordinarily disagree with most of the stored arguments that oppose their attitudes and agree with arguments that support their attitudes (Feather, 1969) , their knowledge of counterattitudinal arguments may foster memory for such information. Given that the stimulus information in typical attitude memory studies pertained to controversial social issues, bipolarity may have been common in these experiments. As a result, the fit of uncongenial information to attitudinal knowledge structures may have been as good as the fit of congenial information, and the congeniality bias in memory thereby dampened.
To explore the implications of these ideas about bipolarity, we ensured that the coding of the studies in our meta-analysis encompassed the controversiality of attitudinal issues. Controversiality, which commonly induces exposure to both sides of issues, should heighten bipolarity, and thus might weaken the tendency for participants to better remember congenial information. Also, because the dramatic development of the mass media, especially television, may have increased exposure to both sides of many issues, a secular trend toward greater bipolarity in attitude structures could have contributed to the decrease in the congeniality effect that Roberts (1985) found over the years spanned by this research literature.
Consistent with these arguments about bipolarity and unipolarity, Judd and Kulik (1980) maintained that to the extent that people's attitudes exist as bipolar schemas that represent mainly extreme proattitudinal and extreme counterattitudinal positions, memory may favor extreme attitude-relevant information, as opposed to moderate information, regardless of its congeniality. Therefore, when feasible, we also calculated effect sizes representing the extent to which more extreme versus more moderate information was better remembered.
Our theoretical analysis also acknowledges the importance of attitude strength and, more specifically, processing motivation. In many contemporary theories of attitudes, defense of attitudes is regarded as a consequence of their strength, with stronger attitudes predicted to exert greater selective effects on information processing (see Eagly & Chaiken, 1998; Petty & Krosnick, 1995) . Although most conceptions of attitude strength assume more potent selectivity effects for stronger attitudes, some emphasize cognitive aspects of strength, and others emphasize motivational aspects. Examples of cognitively defined strength variables include attitude accessibility (Fazio, 1995) and evaluative-cognitive consistency (Chaiken, Pomerantz, & Giner-Sorolla, 1995) . The impossibility of coding studies on indicators of such cognitive aspects of attitude strength (e.g., response latencies that index attitude accessibility) led us to focus on one important, and codable, motivational indicator of attitude strength: value-relevant involvement.
Value-relevant involvement refers to a psychological state in which one's attitude toward a particular entity is linked to important values or significant reference groups (B. T. Johnson & Eagly, 1989 ; termed ego involvement by Sherif & Hovland, 1961) . For example, issues such as racial integration in the 1950s and 1960s and abortion rights in the 1980s and 1990s would be considered high in value relevance. Because this variable has been shown to predict resistance to influence (see B. T. Johnson & Eagly, 1989; Maio & Olson, 1995) as well as affective and cognitive processes that mediate resistance (Zuwerink & Devine, 1996) , the congeniality effect may be larger with higher levels of value relevance. Moreover, this prediction coheres with both earlier (Sherif & Hovland, 1961) and contemporary (Chaiken, Giner-Sorolla, & Chen, 1996) theoretical perspectives, which hold that defense motivation-defined as the conscious or nonconscious goal of maintaining, reinforcing, or defending beliefs and attitudes-increases to the extent that attitudes implicate important, selfdefining values and reference groups.
The meta-analysis also assessed a second form of involvement, one that we believed would dampen the level of defense motivation. Specifically, we assessed outcome-relevant involvement, a psychological state in which one's attitude toward a particular entity is tied to important, near-term goals (B. T. Johnson & Eagly, 1989 ; termed personal relevance by Petty & Wegener, 1998) . For example, issues such as whether college courses should institute essay exams or institute a study week prior to exam week would be considered relatively high in outcome relevance for student participants because resolution of these issues would have an impact on students' ability to attain their goals. Research on this variable indicates that heightened outcome relevance ordinarily increases relatively objective, open-minded information processing (e.g., Boninger, Krosnick, Berent, & Fabrigar, 1995; B. T. Johnson, 1994; B. T. Johnson & Eagly, 1989; Petty & Cacioppo, 1990) , presumably because increased outcome relevance intensifies people's concerns about the correctness, or accuracy, of their attitudes and other judgments (e.g., Chaiken, Wood, & Eagly, 1996; Petty & Wegener, 1998) . This accuracy-oriented, or open-minded, processing should dampen the selectivity that follows from defending one's attitude. Therefore, outcome-relevant involvement should reduce the size of the congeniality effect.
A complexity in understanding the impact of heightened motivation to defend one's attitudes is that a variety of specific processes may be elicited by such motivation (Chaiken, Liberman, & Eagly, 1989; Kunda, 1990) . Most prior conceptions of defensive processing have assumed relatively passive strategies whereby people shun, distort, or forget attitude-incongruent information. Moving away from these somewhat simple assumptions, we considered the possibility of a more active strategy that would entail greater attention to incongruent information and more elaboration of it (e.g., K. Edwards & Smith, 1996) . This conception of attitudinal defense suggests that stored beliefs supportive of attitudes enable people not only to remember congenial arguments but also to refute challenging information (Biek, Wood, & Chaiken, 1996; Chaiken, Wood, & Eagly, 1996; Eagly & Chaiken, 1993 Greenwald, 1968; Wood, Rhodes, & Biek, 1995) . Moreover, bipolarity in the form of familiarity with arguments opposed to one's own attitude may further enable refutational elaboration of uncongenial information. Such active refutational processes would reflect an attitudinal bias in processing but may enhance rather than reduce memory for uncongenial information, because they entail careful scrutiny of this information (e.g., Chaiken et al., 1995; Eagly, Kulesa, Brannon, Shaw-Barnes, & Hutson-Comeaux, 1996; Zimmerman & Chaiken, 1996) . Although it would have been desirable to code studies on participants' active versus passive defense strategies, studies did not report information that would have enabled such coding. We suspected that, because Roberts (1985) obtained an overall congeniality effect, passive strategies may have predominated in attitude memory experiments. However, in view of the limitations of Roberts's review and evidence of active defense of attitudes on controversial issues (e.g., K. Edwards & Smith, 1996) , we were uncertain about the relative frequency of active and passive processes. Nonetheless, our predictions that value-relevant involvement would increase the congeniality bias and that outcome-relevant involvement would decrease it assume that defensive goals are pursued primarily by passive processing strategies by which people shun, avoid, and distort uncongenial information.
In summary, active defense of attitudes might promote good memory for uncongenial information, and bipolar attitude structures could reduce the memory advantage of congenial information. Such theoretical considerations weakened our a priori confidence that this meta-analysis would confirm an overall congeniality bias in memory and suggested that experiments might sometimes find better memory for uncongenial information. Despite these possibilities, we framed our meta-analysis in terms of the traditional hypothesis that attitudes exert a congeniality bias on memory and that this bias holds to a greater or lesser extent.
Design of the Present Synthesis
In identifying studies for inclusion in the meta-analysis, we sought only experiments of unambiguous relevance to the hypothesis that attitudes exert a causal impact on memory for information that people confront in their environments (see Method section for details). The sample was thus limited to studies in which participants were experimentally exposed to proattitudinal and counterattitudinal information. This criterion excluded studies in which participants merely recollected whatever attitude-relevant experience they may have had in the past (e.g., Ross, 1989) . Limiting the sample to experiments with appropriate designs also caused us to exclude studies in which participants' attitudes were assessed after exposure to attitude-relevant messages, because such studies are vulnerable to the alternative causal interpretation that exposure to persuasive communications changes attitudes. In addition, this synthesis does not encompass research on memory for information that is congruent versus incongruent with people's expectancies, a literature that was quantitatively synthesized by Stangor and McMillan (1992) and Rojahn and Pettigrew (1992) . The minimal overlap between our sample of studies and those of these two syntheses of research on expectancy-relevant information is theoretically sensible because the rationale for why attitudes bias memory in favor of congruent information need not, and typically has not, posited expectancies as an agent or mediator of such effects. Although the evaluation of entities as positive or negative may well influence people's hopes, desires, and wishes about the attitudinal position advocated by subsequently encountered information, these evaluative tendencies bear at best a complex relationship to people's expectancies about the attitudinal congeniality of this information (McGuire & McGuire, 1991) .
Despite these more stringent criteria for excluding data sets that did not provide appropriate tests of the congeniality hypothesis, the present synthesis is considerably more comprehensive than Roberts's (1985) review. Even though our selection criteria resulted in the elimination of 10 of Roberts's 38 experiments, our sample of studies included 70 experiments. Although this larger number included some experiments published after Roberts concluded his search, the increment was mainly due to more thorough search techniques.
The coding system for this quantitative synthesis encompassed many potentially important methodological variables in view of hints that early attitude memory studies might have been methodologically flawed (e.g., Greenwald, 1975 ) and Roberts's (1985) finding that earlier studies yielded a larger congeniality bias. These variables were designed to deal with issues as mundane as measurement reliability and validity and as complex as the confounding of attitudinal congeniality with other variables such as familiarity with the information.
Our methodological focus directed attention to how memory was assessed. This issue was neglected by earlier researchers, who focused on explanations for why and how attitudes might influence information processing and generally treated memory as a monolithic and unitary construct. Representing some of the complexities of memory requires, at a minimum, that measures be classified into major types. Thus, like the syntheses of expectancy effects on memory (Rojahn & Pettigrew, 1992; Stangor & McMillan, 1992) , the present synthesis of attitudinal effects on memory classified effect sizes according to whether they were based on recall or on either of two types of recognition measures-uncorrected recognition measures, which are not corrected for guessing and other biases, and recognition sensitivity measures, which are corrected (see Shapiro, 1994; Srull, 1984) . Although in the primary studies researchers virtually never stated hypotheses about the differential impact of attitudes on different types of memory measures, some assumptions about the processes that mediate memory for attituderelevant information could produce differential predictions.
Predictions about the moderating impact of different classes of memory measures could follow from Stangor and McMillan's (1992) and Rojahn and Pettigrew's (1992) reports that recognition sensitivity measures produced greater memory for expectancyincongruent information, whereas uncorrected recognition measures produced greater memory for congruent information. As the authors of these two meta-analyses reasoned, this result likely occurred at least in part because, when confronted by recognition measures, research participants tended to guess in line with their expectancies. To the extent that participants might also tend to guess in line with their attitudes, the congeniality effect should be smaller for recognition sensitivity measures than for uncorrected recognition measures. In addition, measures of recognition are thought to assess whether information has been encoded at all, whereas measures of free recall are thought to assess, at least in part, the ability to retrieve information from memory (e.g., Stull, 1984) . Therefore, comparing the magnitude of the congeniality effect on recall and recognition measures may prove informative concerning whether attitude memory effects are mediated by encoding or retrieval processes.
Method

Sample of Studies
We conducted computer-based information searches using the keyword attitude (or functionally similar terms such as opinion, belief, affect, and frame of reference) or selectivity (or functionally similar terms such as congruent-incongruent and consistent-inconsistent) when paired with memory (or functionally similar terms such as recall, retention, recognition, forgetting, and remembering). These keywords were searched in the following databases from the beginning point of each database through 1995: Psychological Abstracts (PsycLIT), Dissertation Abstracts International (Dissertation Abstracts Ondisc), and Educational Resources Information Center. We searched the Social Sciences Citation Index to locate articles that cited any of five seminal attitude memory experiments (Greenwald & Sakumura, 1967; Jones & Aneshansel, 1956; Jones & Kohler, 1958; Levine & Murphy, 1943; Watson & Hartmann, 1939) . Also searched were the reference lists of Roberts's (1985) review article and all of the attitude memory studies that we located.
One of the criteria for including studies in the sample was that participants' attitudes were assessed, or a difference in their attitudes could be safely assumed between the congenial and uncongenial conditions. For example, in some studies examining memory for favorable or unfavorable information pertaining to an in-group or out-group, participants' attitudes toward their own ethnic in-group (e.g., English Canadians) could be safely assumed to be more positive than their attitudes toward an out-group (e.g., French Canadians; Dutta, Kanungo, & Freibergs, 1972, Experiment 3) . Other criteria were that (a) standardized attitude-relevant, verbal information was presented to participants; (b) this information was favorable or unfavorable toward the attitude object; (c) memory for this information was assessed; and (d) the design varied the evaluative consistency between participants' attitudes and the attitudinal position of the information, producing both congenial and uncongenial conditions. Studies were excluded if the test of congeniality was based on assumptions about participants' attitudes that were not empirically validated and are arguably invalid given other findings in the literature. For example, Alper and Korchin's (1952) and Clark's (1940) assumption that female students were more profemale and antimale than male students is risky in view of Eagly, Mladinic, and Otto's (1991) finding that male and female students did not differ in their attitudes toward either men or women. Greaves's (1972) assumption that U.S. students had more favorable attitudes toward the United States than Sweden is risky in view of Stapf, Stroebe, and Jonas's (1986) evidence that U.S. students' attitudes toward Sweden were nearly as favorable as their attitudes toward the United States and that their attitudes toward Swedes were slightly more favorable than their attitudes toward Americans.
Studies were omitted if they did not ensure that all participants were exposed to the same stimulus information (e.g., Eberhart & Bauer, 1941; Feather, 1969) . They were also excluded if the stimulus information was presented in incomplete form (e.g., Donohew, 1966; Manis & Dawes, 1961) or pictorial form (e.g., Gackenbach & Auerbach, 1985) , or if the information took a neutral or ambiguous position on the relevant issue (e.g., Clark, 1940; Garber, 1955) . Studies were also omitted if the memory measure did not assess memory for the stimulus information (e.g., Weiss, 1953) .
Studies were omitted if the attitude object that was the focus of the attitude-relevant information was not at least moderately compatible with the attitude object implied by the attitude measure, because, for an adequate test of the congeniality hypothesis, these two attitude objects should be the same or at least moderately closely related. For example, studies by Matthew (1975) , Furnham and Singh (1986) , and Furnham and Duignan (1989) were excluded because they assessed participants' attitudes toward equal rights for women but presented information consisting of positive and negative statements about men or women as social groups. Because attitudes toward equal rights for women have been shown to be unrelated or minimally related to attitudes toward women and men as social groups (Eagly & Mladinic, 1989; Swim & Cohen, 1997) , the attitude measure was not compatible with the information.
Studies of the consistency of stimuli with expectancies or stereotypes were excluded and carefully distinguished from attitude memory studies, which examined the consistency of stimuli with attitudes. Studies of memory for information that is congruent versus incongruent with expectancies are designed to compare reactions to information that is expected versus unexpected rather than consistent versus inconsistent with a prior attitude (see Rojahn & Pettigrew, 1992; Stangor & McMillan, 1992) . A possible area of overlap between these two literatures consists of studies examining evaluative expectancies; for example, Reutzel and Hollingsworth (1991) presented information inducing a positive or negative attitude toward a fictitious country before presenting a passage that contained favorable or unfavorable information about the country. Such studies were excluded if they presented evaluatively consistent stimulus information whose content was highly redundant with the information that established the expectancy and presented evaluatively inconsistent information whose content was highly contradictory to this information (e.g., Ikegami, 1986; Reutzel & Hollingsworth, 1991) . In contrast, a study establishing evaluative expectancies would be included if it presented stimulus information that was merely evaluatively consistent or inconsistent with the valence of the expectancy but was not highly consistent or inconsistent in terms of its specific content.
Studies were excluded if attitude was assessed only as a postmeasure (e.g., Berent, Krosnick, & Boninger, 1993; Brigham & Cook, 1969; Doob, 1953; Pratkanis, Syak, & Gamble, 1987; Upmeyer & Layer, 1974) , because the stimulus information may have affected the attitude and, moreover, such studies cannot be distinguished from persuasion studies that included a measure of memory for message content (e.g., Leippe & Elkin, 1987) . However, if attitude was operationalized as agreement with individual attitude-relevant statements (e.g., Greenwald & Sakumura, 1967) , studies were included even though attitude was assessed immediately after the presentation of the stimuli. This inclusion rule recognizes that an agreement rating following a statement is less likely to be confounded with persuasion than a rating following a longer message.
1 Finally, studies were omitted if the congeniality effect size, its direction, and significance were all unknown (e.g., Gormly, 1974) .
In summary, these somewhat stringent selection criteria narrowed the sample to studies with designs appropriate to examine the impact of the attitudinal congeniality of verbal attitude-relevant information on memory for the information.
2 The resulting sample consisted of 60 documents reporting 70 studies.
Variables Coded From Each Study
The following general information was coded from each report: (a) year of publication; (b) publication form (journal article; dissertation, master's thesis, or other unpublished document); (c) participant population (high school or junior high school students; college students; mixed or other, e.g., 1 Subsequent analyses of the congeniality effect showed that these studies in which agreement was assessed immediately after presentation of each attitude-relevant statement did not differ systematically from the other studies included in the meta-analysis.
2 A list of the studies excluded by these criteria is available from Alice H. Eagly.
visitors to Ontario Science Center) 3 ; and (d) nation where study was conducted (United States; other).
To represent the experimental design, coders distinguished between three methods of defining whether information was attitudinally congenial or uncongenial: (a) sidedness, defined by information on participants' own side versus the other side of the issue (e.g., Levine & Murphy, 1943; Watson & Hartmann, 1939) ; (b) agreeability, defined by participants' rated agreement with the stimuli (e.g., Eiser & Monk, 1978; Judd & Kulik, 1980; Postman & Murphy, 1943) ; and (c) balance, defined by the sidedness and the agreeability of the information-that is, congenial information consisted of agreeable information on participants' own side of the issue and disagreeable information on the other side, and uncongenial information consisted of agreeable information on the other side and disagreeable information on participants' own side (Callahan & Olson, 1981; Olson, 1980; Waly & Cook, 1966) . Agreeability was determined by the participants' own judgments or by ratings from independent judges. With balance definitions, the agreeability of the information was sometimes defined as its plausibility or effectiveness. The findings of studies using the balance definition often could be decomposed to provide a test of the congeniality hypothesis according to either the sidedness or the agreeability definition or both definitions (e.g., Olson, 1980) . In such cases, the sidedness definition considered only agreeable information on participants' own side and disagreeable information on the other side; the agreeability definition considered all agreeable versus disagreeable information, regardless of its side.
Other features of the design that were coded included (a) independent variables contributing to the test of congeniality (participant attitude only; attitudinal position of information only; both participant attitude and position of information; mixed); (b) position of participants' attitudes (pro, con, or one side; both pro and con; one side but differing in extremity; unselected for attitudinal position or mixed); (c) definition of attitude groups (extreme groups; median or other attitudinal split, e.g., pro vs. con; only one attitude group; continuous variation of attitude; mixed or other); (d) position of stimulus information (pro, con, or one side; both pro and con); and (e) error term for calculating congeniality effect size (within subjects; between subjects; mixed or other, e.g., correlational design).
In addition, the following characteristics of the attitude measure were coded; (a) inclusion of measure (included; attitude position merely assumed); (b) reliability (single item; multiple item with unknown or low reliability; multiple item with high reliability, >.80; no measure, unclear, unknown, or mixed); (c) timing (pretest in prior session; pretest within session; simultaneous with presentation of stimulus information; no measure; unclear, unknown, or mixed); and (d) compatibility of assessed attitude with the attitude object described by the stimulus information (high; moderate).
Several characteristics of the attitudinal issue were assessed. The value relevance of the issue was judged to be high if it was judged to be linked to important values or significant reference groups (e.g., morally or ethically significant issues such as abortion, U.S. involvement in Vietnam); otherwise, it was judged to be low. The outcome relevance of the issue was judged to be high if it had the potential for impact on participants' relatively near-term outcomes (e.g.,-tuition increase, use of essay exams); otherwise, it was judged to be low. The coders judged that the controversiality of the issue was high or low by rendering a subjective assessment of the extent to which both pro-and anti-information were readily available in the participants' environment. Similarly, the coders judged that familiarity with the issue was high or low by rendering a subjective assessment of how widely discussed the issue was in the participants' environment. When studies used multiple issues, one or more of these characteristics of the attitudinal issue sometimes had to be coded as "mixed." Also, in a few instances there was no basis for judging one or more of these characteristics because the coders lacked sufficient information about how the particular issue was regarded by participants and presented in their environment. Preliminary, more detailed coding of these four characteristics of the attitudinal issues was simplified because it did not yield superior prediction of the effect sizes. The coders also noted whether the participants were selected as activists on the attitudinal issue.
The following aspects of the stimulus information were coded: (a) mode of presentation (written paced or timed; written unpaced; audio; video; live; other or mixed); (b) form (words or paired associates; statements; passages; other or mixed); (c) source (written by these or other researchers; taken or condensed from other sources such as newspaper articles; unknown, other, or mixed); (d) length (number of words, if known); (e) evidence of attitudinal position (pretesting or participants' ratings; no evidence); (f) attitudinal extremity (high; medium; mixed or unknown); and (g) greater familiarity with the congenial than the uncongenial stimulus information (no; unlikely; likely). This familiarity confound was coded no if the researcher tested and failed to confirm the hypothesis that participants were more familiar with congenial information. Greater familiarity with the congenial information was coded unlikely if (a) design features made a familiarity confound unlikely (e.g., novel issue, adjectives as stimuli); (b) the attitudinal issue was widely discussed and highly controversial, suggesting that participants were familiar with both sides; or (c) the author made plausible on some other basis a claim that familiarity was not confounded with congeniality. Finally, this familiarity confound was coded likely in the absence of features resulting in coding as no or unlikely.
The following contextual aspects of the experiment were also coded: (a) setting for exposure to stimulus information (laboratory; class; other or unknown); (b) setting for memory measurement (laboratory; class; other or unknown); (c) social setting (alone, with or without experimenter; with other participants; unknown or mixed); (d) set for responding to stimulus information (intentional learning, i.e., learn or memorize; less intentional, i.e., give opinions or attitudes, judge for argument effectiveness, give other judgments; unclear, unknown, or mixed); and (e) activation of attitudes during exposure to stimulus information (high; medium; low; mixed or no basis for judgment). Activation was coded by the following rules: high if a premeasure of attitude was administered just before the presentation of the stimuli or if the attitude was especially salient in the cover story (e.g., Love & Greenwald, 1978) ; medium if the experimental instructions mentioned an interest in participants' attitudes (e.g., Furnham & Proctor, 1990) ; and low if attitudes or agreement was not mentioned or if a distracting or misleading set was imposed (e.g., Levine & Murphy, 1943) .
Characteristics of the memory measurement included the time interval between the message and the memory measure, which was represented by coding (a) timing of memory measure (immediate, defined as within session; delayed, defined as in subsequent session; both immediate and delayed); (b) interpolated activity between message and immediate memory measure (present; absent; mixed); (c) time interval for immediate measure, in minutes; and (d) time interval for delayed measure, in days.
Several different types of memory measures appeared in this literature: free recall, cued recall, uncorrected recognition (hit rate; false-alarm rate; miss rate; correct rejection rate; forced choice or multiple choice), recog-nition sensitivity (d' and similar measures), or mixed. Recognition sensitivity (d 1 ) is a measure of recognition memory derived from statistical decision theory (Green & Swets, 1966) . It is ordinarily computed by subtracting the standard score corresponding to the false-alarm rate (i.e., proportion of foils selected) from the standard score corresponding to the hit rate (i.e., proportion of correct items selected; Srull, 1984, p. 31) . Higher sensitivity scores thus reflect greater ability to accurately distinguish between the correct items and the foil items. Separate analyses on the various types of uncorrected recognition measures were potentially informative, but there were too few instances of each type to permit meaningful analyses. Measures of distortion of the stimulus information were excluded because they were few in number and very heterogeneous in their design. Also, it was often not clear what the congeniality hypothesis would predict about the direction of distortion on the measure (e.g., A. L. Edwards, 1941b) .
Other aspects of the memory measure that were coded are the following: (a) blindness of coding of measure requiring content analysis (blind; not blind; no information; mixed); (b) reliability of coding (two coders with high reliability, >.80; two coders with low or unknown reliability; one coder; unclear, unknown, or mixed); (c) number of trials assessing memory that entered into effect size; (d) number of exposures to stimulus information before memory was assessed; and (e) order of memory measure in sequence of measures (first or only; second; third or higher; mixed or unknown).
All coding was performed independently by two teams, each consisting of two of the authors, with a satisfactory mean agreement across the variables: K = .80 (91% agreement) for variables requiring categorical judgments and r = 1.00 for variables estimated on a continuous scale. The kappas ranged from .35 (91% agreement, for selection of activists) to 1.00 (100% agreement, for several variables). Disagreements were resolved by discussion.
Computation and Analysis of Effect Sizes
The effect size calculated was g, which was the difference between memory for attitudinally congenial and uncongenial information, divided by the relevant standard deviation. When congeniality was a between-subjects variable, this standard deviation was computed separately within the congenial and uncongenial conditions and pooled. When congeniality was a within-subjects variable, the standard deviation was the standard deviation of the differences between the paired observations, because the pooled standard deviation could not be estimated from the statistics provided. All standard deviations were estimated, whenever possible, only from the portion of each study's data entering into the effect size. The sign of the effect size was positive when congenial information was more memorable than uncongenial information and negative when uncongenial information was more memorable. In addition, we also computed extremity effect sizes whenever possible. The sign of these effect sizes was positive when extreme information was more memorable than moderate information and negative when moderate information was more memorable.
To reduce the potential for knowledge of a study's congeniality finding to bias the coding of its study characteristics, we calculated the effect sizes after the coding was completed. These effect sizes were calculated independently by two of the authors with the aid of a computer program (B. T. Johnson, 1993) , and the statistical significance and direction of the congeniality comparisons were also recorded. Whenever possible, separate effect sizes were calculated for different types of measures of memory. In addition, whenever possible, separate effect sizes were calculated within levels of the following independent variables, when they were manipulated or varied in an experimental design: (a) delay of memory measurement; (b) definition of attitudinal congeniality; (c) set for responding to stimulus information; (d) involvement, commitment, or importance; (e) learning trials (first trial vs. later trials); and (f) any individual difference variable (e.g., high vs. low dogmatism). These within-level congeniality effect sizes were used only in models examining the impact of the independent variable that produced these levels. For example, in a model examining the impact of measurement delay the separate immediate and delayed effect sizes were used, whereas in other models the effect sizes were averaged over delay of measurement. This strategy, recommended by Cooper (1989) , took advantage of within-study manipulations of moderator variables while preserving insofar as possible the independence of the effect sizes. Moreover, to fully satisfy the independence assumption of metaanalytic statistics, we also computed a single study-level effect size, averaging all separately calculated effect sizes for each study (see B. T. Johnson & Eagly, in press ).
The computation of g was based on (a) means and standard deviations or error terms for 167 of the effect sizes; (b) Fs, ts, or zs for 48; (c) correlations or chi-squares for 23; (d) proportions or frequencies for 14; and (e) mixed statistical sources for 14. Thus, a total of 271 effect sizes were computed.
Following Hedges and Olkin's (1985) procedures, the gs were converted to ds by correcting them for bias. All mean ds (and models) were computed with each effect size weighted by the reciprocal of its variance, a procedure that gives more weight to effect sizes that are more reliably estimated. 4 To determine whether each set of ds shared a common effect size (i.e., were consistent across the studies), we calculated a homogeneity statistic Q, which has an approximate chi-square distribution with k -1 degrees of freedom, where k is the number of effect sizes.
In the absence of homogeneity, we accounted for variability in heterogeneous effect sizes by calculating fixed-effect categorical and continuous models that related the effect sizes to the attributes of the studies (Hedges & Olkin, 1985) . Calculation of a categorical model provides a betweenclasses effect, Q B , and a test of the homogeneity of the effect sizes within each class, Q w , The continuous models are least-squares simple linear and multiple regressions. Each such model yields a test of the significance of each predictor as well as a test of model specification, <2 E , which evaluates whether significant systematic variation remains unexplained in the regression model.
As a supplementary analysis, we attained homogeneity among the effect sizes by sequentially removing the effect sizes that reduced the homogeneity statistic by the largest amount (see Hedges & Olkin, 1985) . Studies yielding these outlying effect sizes were then examined after the fact to determine if they appeared to differ methodologically from the other studies. In addition, the central tendency of the effect sizes was recomputed after removal of these effect sizes.
Results
Characteristics of the Studies
Before summarizing the tests of the congeniality hypothesis reported in attitude memory research, we display the characteristics of the studies in the sample so that the overall meta-analytic findings can be interpreted in relation to the studies' typical methods. As shown by the central tendencies of the characteristics listed in Table 1 , the majority of studies were published in earlier decades and as journal articles. Typically, the participants were college students, and the study was conducted in the United States.
The most common experimental design implemented a sidedness definition of attitudinal congeniality by presenting participants with information on their own side versus the opposite side of the issue through varying both participant attitude and the attitudinal position of the information. The design usually included groups formed on the basis of their attitudes, either extreme groups or groups divided at the median or split on another basis. The design typically included both pro and con information, and the error term for calculating the congeniality effect was commonly based on between-subjects variability only, within-subjects variability only, or mixed sources. Commonly, an attitude measure was included, although it was not known to have high reliability. The attitude measure, typically administered as a pretest in a prior session, usually assessed an attitude that was highly compatible with the attitude object described by the stimulus information.
The attitudinal issues used in the research were typically high in value relevance and high or low in outcome relevance. The issues were somewhat more often high than low in controversiality and somewhat more often low than high in familiarity to participants. The participants were rarely selected as activists.
The stimulus information was most often written (paced or unpaced), but other modes of presentation were not uncommon. Passages were the most frequent form of stimulus information, with statements also quite common. These stimuli were usually written by researchers, and their length was substantial. Although sometimes there was empirical evidence of the attitudinal position of this stimulus information, often there was no such evidence. The attitudinal extremity of the stimulus information was generally unknown. In the typical study, it was unlikely that the participants were more familiar with the congenial stimulus information than the uncongenial information.
The contextual characteristics of the experiment included a laboratory setting for both exposure to the stimuli and measurement of memory. Participants usually took part with other participants and somewhat less often took part alone. When it was possible to discern the set that the participants were given for responding to the stimulus information, most often it was a less intentional set (i.e., give judgments) rather than an intentional learning set (i.e., learn or memorize). Generally, the activation of participants' attitudes during exposure to the stimulus information was high or low.
The measurement of memory typically consisted of only an immediate measure, although a substantial minority of studies included both immediate and delayed measures. Typically, there was no interpolated activity between the message and the immediate memory measure, which followed within 1 min. The delayed measure, if present, typically occurred 1 day later. The modal type of memory measure was free recall, but other types of measures occurred. If the measure required coding, coders were most frequently not known to be blind to participants' experimental condition. Although often two coders established high reliability, the coding reliability was commonly unclear, unknown, or mixed. Ordinarily, the test of memory was based on only one assessment trial and one exposure to the stimuli. Typically, the memory measure was the first in a sequence of measures or the only measure.
Summary of Study-Level Effect Sizes
The summary of the study-level effect sizes given in Table 2 allows one to determine whether, on the whole, congenial information was more memorable than uncongenial information. In this table (and subsequent tables), an overall congeniality effect is suggested by a positive mean effect size that differed significantly from the no-difference value of 0.00 (as indicated by a confidence interval that does not include 0.00). The mean weighted effect size of 0.23 averaged across all 65 studies that yielded study-level effect sizes differed from 0.00, indicating an overall congeniality effect. 5 The mean unweighted effect size of 0.33 also differed from 0.00. However, the median effect size of 0.10 was quite small, and the proportion of study-level comparisons favoring congeniality (41 of 68 comparisons, yielding a proportion of .60) did not differ from .50, the proportion expected under the null hypothesis (p < .12 by sign test). 6 As also shown in Table 2 , the effect sizes were not homogeneous, and homogeneity was not attained until 17 of them were removed, which is a substantial proportion of the effect sizes (.26). The removal of these outlying effect sizes produced a considerably smaller weighted mean of 0.08, which nonetheless differed significantly from 0.00. The reason that the removal of these effect sizes substantially reduced the mean effect size can be understood from inspecting the stem-and-leaf plot given in Figure 1 . Although the great majority of the effect sizes in the full sample were located between -0.5 and 0.8, the data set includes quite a few large positive effect sizes. There was one extremely large positive effect size, which is a value of 8.74 from an experiment conducted in Japan (Kitano, 1970) . Elimination of this one effect size from the calculation of the mean weighted study-level effect size changed it only slightly, d + = 0.22, CI = 0.18/0.26, g(63) = 670.83, p < .001. The next largest effect size, a value of 2.20, was from the frequently cited Levine and Murphy (1943) study. Of the 17 effect sizes whose removal was required to attain homogeneity, 14 were positive.
7 Only the Kitano (1970) study was excluded from the subsequent tests of models; its extremely large magnitude suggests that the experiment or its reporting had unique attributes not discernible from the article.
Given that only 60% of the effect sizes favored congeniality, it is also interesting to aggregate the absolute value of the effect 5 The five studies for which effect sizes could not be calculated were Dupree (1992) , Janis and Rausch (1970) , Kulik (1980), Wallston (1970) , and Watson and Hartman (1939) . 6 For three studies (Dupree, 1992; Janis & Rausch, 1970; Wallston, 1970) , the congeniality effect was known to be nonsignificant; the effect's direction was known, but statistical information was not sufficient to allow calculation of an effect size. When effect sizes of 0.00 were assigned to these studies, the estimates of central tendency became the following: M weighted d = 0.22 (confidence interval, or CI = 0.18/0.26); M unweighted d = 0.33 (CI = 0.05/0.62); median d = 0.08. 7 The studies removed in addition to Kitano (1970) and Levine and Murphy (1943) , listed in the order in which they were removed, along with their effect sizes, are the following: Schmidt (1969), 1.37; Gallon (1966 Gallon ( / 1967 sizes. This analysis produced a mean weighted effect size of 0.38 (CI = 0.34/0.42), 8 which should be compared with the mean of the signed effect sizes, 0.23. This absolute-value mean thus shows that the impact of attitudes on memory can be considered more substantial if the direction of attitudes' effect on memory is ignored, because effects occurred in both the congeniality and the countercongeniality direction. The analysis of the absolute-value effect sizes showed that they were heterogeneous, (2(64) = 617.78, p < .001, and nine outlying effect sizes (14% of the sample) were removed to produce homogeneity.
Only five studies allowed the calculation of extremity effect sizes, and these yielded a mean weighted d of 0.24 (CI = 0.06/ 0.42), with positive values assigned to superior memory for extreme information. Thus, extreme information had a small advantage over more moderate information. Also, these five effect sizes approached homogeneity, Q(4) = 8.12, p < .10.
Effects of Type of Memory Measure
Classification of the effect sizes by the type of memory measure should help interpret the overall tests of the congeniality hypothesis. Because a preliminary analysis established that free-recall and cued-recall measures did not produce different results, these two types of measures were combined into a single recall category. Another preliminary analysis divided these recall measures according to whether the relevant document (a) stated that the coding of recall was blind to participants' attitudes (or no coding was required) or (b) failed to mention that the coding was blind. Although the effect sizes were significantly larger when the coding was not known to be blind, a subsequent analysis showed that this elevation of the effect sizes occurred for the small subset of studies published prior to 1960 and not for the studies published subsequently. Therefore, recall measures were divided into two groups: (a) pre-1960 measures for which coding was not known to be blind and (b) all other recall measures, regardless of whether coding was known to be blind. Recognition measures were also divided into two groups: (a) uncorrected recognition measures and (b) recognition sensitivity (d') measures, which are controlled for bias.
The resulting analysis, shown in Table 3 , displays the effect sizes for the two types of recall measures and the two types of recognition measures. The congeniality effect was very large for the pre-1960 recall measures that were not known to be blind and quite small but significant for the remaining recall measures. 9 These studies from before 1960 whose recall measures were not known to be blind are the following: Jones and Aneshansel (1956) , d = -0.03; Jones and Kohler (1958) , Study 1, d = 0.84; Jones and Kohler (1958) , Study 2, d = 1.72; and Levine and Murphy (1943) , d = 2.20. Because this analysis was based on study-level effect sizes, it failed to represent the Nonblind coding may well have taken place in the earlier studies (and was in fact implied for Jones & Kohler, 1958 , Study 1), and coders' expectancies may have biased findings toward the hypothesized congeniality effect. In addition, the congeniality effect was significant for the uncorrected recognition measures and absent for the recognition sensitivity measures. Uncorrected recognition measures, which were not controlled for guessing and other biases, may also have been biased toward congeniality.
Effects of Publication Year
As shown in Table 4 , the congeniality effect weakened during the years over which these experiments were conducted: The effect of publication year on the 64 study-level effect sizes was substantial. In view of the strong effects of type of memory measure already presented, it is important to determine whether this secular trend might plausibly be attributed to measurement biases that favored the congeniality effect in the earlier studies. Calculation of continuous models within various subsets of the effect sizes allowed exploration of this issue. interaction effect produced by Jones and Aneshansel, who predicted a congeniality effect in their control condition (i.e., learning set) and a reversal of the effect in their experimental condition (i.e., counterarguing set). In line with this prediction, the effect sizes for Jones and Aneshansel's experiment were 0.75 in their control condition and -0.82 in their experimental condition. When 0.75 was substituted for the study-level effect size of -0.03, the mean weighted effect size for the first category of Table 3 (recall from pre-1960 studies with coding not known to be blind) became 1.36, CI = 1.19/1.53, G w .(3) = 49.42, p < .001. The one pre-1960 study using a recall measure for which the absence of blind coding was not an issue (Postman & Murphy, 1943 , which did not require coding) produced a small effect size of 0.12.
When the recall measures and the recognition measures were analyzed separately, the relation of the effect sizes to publication year remained significant in both analyses (see Table 4 ). To examine whether this weakening of the congeniality effect over time on the recall measures reflected the large effect sizes from the pre-1960 studies that were suspected to have nonblind coding of free recall, we removed these four effect sizes from the set of recall effect sizes and recalculated the continuous model for the recall measures. Consistent with the suspicion that this coding problem was critical to the shrinkage of the congeniality effect, this model was weaker and only marginally significant. For the recognition measures, the decline in the strength of the congeniality effect could have reflected the use of recognition sensitivity measures in the more recent studies, because these measures yielded only very small effect sizes. Indeed, removing these presumably less-biased estimates of the congeniality effect (leaving only the uncorrected recognition measures) reduced the magnitude of the effect of publication year, although it remained significant.
Another possibility is that the overall weakening of the conge- niality effect might be due in part to increasing bipolarity in participants' attitude structures, a variable that we argued may be related to the controversially of the issues used in attitude memory experiments. However, the correlation between year of publication and issues' controversiality proved to be nonsignificant, r(54) = .20, p < .15. 10 Moreover, the magnitude of the relation between publication year and the congeniality effect sizes was not reduced when controversiality was controlled by entering it along with publication year in a multiple regression model.
Complementing these analyses of the congeniality effect sizes is an analysis on the absolute value of the congeniality effect sizes. This model was also significant, b = -0.01, /3 = -.36, SE(b) = 0.0013, p < .001, indicating that the effect sizes also became smaller in their absolute value as years passed. Thus, the disappearance of the congeniality effect was not accompanied by a greater trend toward countercongeniality. Rather, as Figure 2 shows, the effects tended to gravitate toward null findings.
Given the results of these initial analyses involving type of memory measure and publication year, the remaining moderator analyses were calculated separately within the recognition measures and the recall measures and also on overall memory, which ignored the distinction between types of memory measures. The set of recall measures (and the set of overall memory measures) used in these subsequent analyses omitted the four effect sizes from the pre-1960 studies that did not note blind coding because (a) these measures were suspected to be contaminated by artifact and (b) their inclusion or exclusion did have substantial impact on the findings that other moderators produced. However, the set of recognition measures used in the remaining analyses was complete. The measures based on recognition sensitivity were not sufficiently numerous to analyze separately, and their inclusion or exclusion had little impact on the findings that other moderators produced.
Effects of Characteristics of Attitudinal Issue
The congeniality effect was significantly related to the value relevance and the outcome relevance of the attitudinal issues. These models showed trends in the predicted directions of value relevance increasing the congeniality effect and outcome relevance decreasing it. As shown in Table 5 , the congeniality effect was larger when the attitudinal issue was high in value relevance compared with low in value relevance. This model was significant for both recognition and recall. As shown in Table 6 , the congeniality effect was weaker when the attitudinal issue was high in outcome relevance compared with low in outcome relevance, although this model was nonsignificant on the recognition measures.
As shown in Table 7 , the controversiality of the attitudinal issue also produced a significant overall model in the predicted direction of high controversiality dampening the congeniality effect. Yet, when controversiality was examined separately within the recall and recognition measures, only the recall model was significant.
Effects of Timing of Memory Measure
As shown in Table 8 , the congeniality effect was larger for the measures that were delayed, defined as administered in a session subsequent to the stimulus exposure, than it was for measures that were immediate, defined as administered in the same session as stimulus exposure. Although this model confirmed the effect obtained by Roberts (1985) , it was significant only on the recognition measures and not on the recall measures. Moreover, parallel tendencies for the congeniality effect to increase with delay were not obtained for models examining (a) the presence versus absence of interpolated activity preceding the immediate measure and (b) the length of the time interval before measurement within the stimulus exposure session for the immediate measures or between the exposure and delayed sessions for the delayed measures.
Effects of Nation Where Study Was Conducted
As shown in Table 9 , the congeniality effect was stronger in studies conducted in nations other than the United States than in studies conducted in the United States. This difference was significant for both the recall and recognition measures. Interpretation of this unpredicted nations effect should take into account the fact that the foreign studies included several conducted in Canada, whose effect sizes differed from those of the U.S. studies and did not differ from those of studies conducted in other non-U.S. nations.
Other Moderators
Table 10 displays the relation of the effect sizes to the error term used for calculating the congeniality effect size. In studies that pro- Note. Models are weighted least-squares simple linear regressions calculated with weights equal to the reciprocal of the variance for each effect size. Effect sizes are positive for superior memory for congenial information and negative for superior memory for uncongenial information, b = unstandardized regression coefficient, ft = standardized regression coefficient, tp < -10 (marginally significant). ***p < .001. duced a within-subjects error term or an error term that was mixed (or the design was correlational), the congeniality effect was larger than it was in studies that produced a between-subjects error term. However, this model remained significant only for the recall measures. Table 11 presents the relation between publication form and the size of the congeniality effect. Consistent with the claim that a publication bias favored the congeniality effect, the congeniality effect was present in journal articles but absent in the unpublished literature. However, this difference between published and unpublished studies was significant only for the recognition measures.
Analyses treating other study characteristics as independent variables either did not yield significant models or were uninterpretable because of missing data or small sample sizes within categories. For example, participants' set for responding to attitudinal information did not significantly affect the size of the congeniality effect. In this regard, an initially more detailed classification of instructional sets, which our coding system implemented, produced no gains of prediction over our final classification of sets into two categories: those produced by instructions to learn intentionally (e.g., learn, memorize) versus less intentionally (e.g., give opinions, judge for argument effectiveness). Other variables yielding nonsignificant or uninterpretable models included experimental design characteristics such as number of exposure trials, number of memory trials, and definition of attitude congeniality; contextual characteristics such as activation of attitudes during stimulus exposure; and stimulus characteristics such as the familiarity of the attitudinal issue, the relative familiarity of the congenial and uncongenial information, and the form, length, attitudinal extremity, and mode of stimulus presentation.
Multiple Regression Analysis
Although most of the significant predictors of the effect sizes were not highly confounded, concerns about their lack of complete independence as well as our desire to determine the adequacy of a model containing several predictors led us to estimate multiple regression models that examined the simultaneous impact of the variables that proved to be significant on a univariate basis. For these analyses, the categorical variables were dummy coded. The model appearing in Table 12 therefore entered type of memory measure (recognition vs. recall), publication year, value relevance. outcome relevance, controversiality, timing of memory measurement, error term for calculating the effect size, publication form, and nation where study was conducted. Several studies appeared more than once in this analysis because they manipulated or varied some of these study characteristics on a within-study basis (specifically, type of memory measure, value relevance, controversiality, and timing of memory measurement); the effect sizes used in this multiple regression analysis were calculated within the resulting levels of these variables.
As shown in Table 12 , the significant predictors in this multiple regression model were type of memory measure, publication year, error term, and nation where study was conducted. Of the remaining predictors, value relevance, outcome relevance, timing of memory measurement, and publication form were rendered nonsignificant. Although controversiality was marginal in this multiple regression equation, the direction of its relation to congeniality was opposite to its direction hi the categorical model (see Table 7 ). The failure of value relevance to remain significant was accounted for largely by its covariation with controversiality, r(S5) = .44, p < .001. When controversiality was removed from the regression equation, value relevance showed a significant positive relation to congeniality, b = 0.12, (3 = .10, SE(b) = 0.06, p < .05. In contrast to the tendency for issues' value relevance to be correlated with their controversiality, their value relevance was uncorrelated with their outcome relevance, r(85) = .04, ns.
The model shown in Table 12 was moderately successful in accounting for variability in the magnitude of the effect sizes. However, the test of model specification (<2 E ) showed that significant systematic variation remained unexplained, and the relatively large Birge ratio (R B ; see Hedges, 1994) showed that the betweenstudies variation not accounted for by the multiple regression model was much larger than what would be expected on the basis of the within-study sampling variance.
Individual Differences in the Strength of the Congeniality Effect
As shown in Table 13 , several studies examined the congeniality effect separately within groups of participants who were classified by measures of personality or attitude structure. Unfortunately, the impact of these variables cannot be examined meta-analytically because multiple representations of these variables could not be found in the attitude memory literature. Nonetheless, the effect sizes computed for these studies suggest that individual differences in the extent to which people exhibit a congeniality bias are explained in part by personality and attitudinal characteristics. Although the difference between the effect sizes for the high and low levels of the individual difference variable was significant (one-tailed) for only two studies by RosenthaPs (1991, p. 65) method for comparing two effect sizes (Kleck & Wheaton, 1967; Zimmerman & Chaiken, 1996 , Study 1), the difference was significant in these studies as well as a third study with the more powerful statistical tests and more complex memory measures sometimes appearing in the reports.
11 Specifically, Kleck and 
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Wheaton (1967) found that the congeniality effect was significantly larger for participants scoring high compared with low on dogmatism. Olson (1980) reported that for the sidedness definition of congeniality (but not for other definitions), repressers showed a significantly stronger congeniality effect than sensitizers. Finally, Zimmerman and Chaiken (1996) conducted two studies in which the congeniality effect was significantly larger among participants whose attitudes were lower rather than higher in evaluativecognitive consistency, defined as the degree of consistency between one's overall evaluation of an attitude object and the evaluative content of one's beliefs about it. In addition, their Study 2 revealed that the congeniality effect was significantly larger among participants whose attitudes were higher rather than lower in evaluative-affective consistency, defined as the degree of consistency between one's overall evaluation of an attitude object and the evaluative content of the affective reactions it elicits. Moreover, in Study 2, the tendency of both of these structural variables to moderate the congeniality effect was more pronounced among participants whose defense motivation had been experimentally heightened.
Discussion
Although memory was generally slightly better for attitudinally congenial information than for uncongenial information, the findings produced by attitude memory studies proved to be very heterogeneous, and, as expected, the congeniality effect was much stronger in the beginning years of this research literature. To explain why the congeniality effect progressively eroded and, more generally, why it was considerably stronger under some circumstances than others, we must engage both methodological and theoretical principles. We invoke these principles by first considering the overall consistency and magnitude of the congeniality effect and then discussing its moderators.
Consistency and Strength of the Congeniality Effect
The inconsistency in the magnitude of the effect sizes was shown by the rejection of the hypothesis of homogeneity and by the removal of a somewhat large proportion of the effect sizes (26%) before a homogeneous set was attained (see Hedges, 1987) . Confirming this judgment about the inconsistency of the effect sizes, the analysis of the direction of the effects indicated that 60% of the study-level comparisons favored congeniality and 40% favored countercongeniality.
Although this heterogeneity of the effect sizes focuses attention on moderator variables rather than the central tendency, it is clear that the congeniality effect must be described as generally small, although reliable in the set of studies. Nearly half of the study-level effect sizes (31 of 65) fell in the range from 0.20 to -0.20 (see Figure 1 ) and thus were quite small. As shown in Table 2 , the values of the measures of central tendency ranged from a high of 0.33 for the unweighted mean to a low of 0.08 for the weighted mean with outliers excluded. These values are comparable to the results of Roberts's (1985) earlier meta-analysis on a smaller subset of the attitude memory literature, which produced an unweighted mean of 0.36.
Confirming the small magnitude of the average congeniality effect size are Cohen's (1977) benchmarks for the d metric by which 0.20 can be described as small, 0.50 as medium, and 0.80 as large. Moreover, transforming our mean weighted effect size of 0.23 into the metric of Rosenthal and Rubin's (1982) binomial effect-size display suggests that above-average memory was manifested by approximately 55.5% of participants who received congenial information and 44.5% of the participants who received uncongenial information. This difference of approximately 11% suggests a modest overall tendency toward congeniality.
Although many meta-analyses in experimental social psychology have produced larger mean effect sizes than the present meta-analysis, attitude memory studies depart from typical methods in social psychology because these studies generally measured rather than manipulated one key independent variable: participants' attitudes. However, given evidence of comparable magni- Note. Effect sizes are positive for superior memory for congenial information and negative for superior memory for uncongenial information. The low category includes all studies for which Controversiality was not coded as high. CI = confidence interval. 2 Significance indicates rejection of the hypothesis of homogeneity, tp < .10 (marginally significant). **p < .01. *** p < .001. tudes of the effects of dispositional variables and manipulated situational variables (Funder & Ozer, 1983) , reliance on an individual differences variable in attitude memory studies cannot be held responsible for the small size of the effects they produced.
Effects of Type of Memory Measure
The search for moderators that would account for variability in the effect sizes began with classifying them according to type of memory measure. These analyses raised questions about the presence of artifacts in early experiments that used recall measures that required coding of participants' responses yet presented no evidence that the coders were blind to the experimental conditions. These experiments yielded very large effect sizes that differed from those yielded by other early experiments. In the absence of evidence that coding of free recall in these early studies was blind to participants' attitudes, it is possible that coders were aware of participants' attitudinal positions and of the researchers' prediction of congeniality. Because these studies predated social psychologists' attention to demand characteristics and experimenter expectancy effects (see Rosenthal & Rosnow, 1969) , researchers might not have been vigilant about the potential for artifact from nonblind coding. Consistent with a growth of methodological sophistication, classifying the post-1960 studies according to whether blind coding was explicitly mentioned in the report did not produce a significant model. Presumably in later studies, the omission of information about the blindness of coding of free recall usually reflected incomplete reporting of the method, not a failure to implement blind coding. When the pre-1960 experiments whose coding was not known to be blind were omitted, the remaining recall measures produced a very small congeniality effect of 0.12.
For the recognition measures, the size of the congeniality effect depended on whether studies assessed memory by recognition sensitivity, which is corrected for bias, or by measures that are not corrected. Whereas the recognition sensitivity measures produced an effect that did not differ from 0.00, the uncorrected recognition measures produced a larger effect size of 0.26. These uncorrected recognition measures differed widely in their specific format and included hit rates, correct rejection rates, and forced-choice or multiple-choice measures. As a general rule, such measures are held to be influenced by various response biases. For example, Note. Effect sizes are positive for superior memory for congenial information and negative for superior memory for uncongenial information. The other nations and number of studies for each nation are the following: Canada, 7; Great Britain, 2; Germany, 2; New Zealand, 2; India, 1. CI = confidence interval. a Significance indicates rejection of the hypothesis of homogeneity. hit-rate measures would favor yea-sayers, who have a general tendency to select many responses as correct. In contrast, recognition sensitivity measures remove this type of bias by subtracting the standard score corresponding to the false-alarm rate from the standard score corresponding to the hit rate.
In the introduction, we noted that a guessing strategy might have increased the magnitude of the congeniality effect for measures that did not correct for this bias. Guessing would have this impact if it were more often consistent than inconsistent with participants' attitudes. Because the uncorrected recognition measures favored congeniality to a greater extent than the recognition sensitivity measures, d + = 0.26 versus -0.05, our meta-analysis substantiates a tendency for guessing to have been consistent with participants' own attitudes. However, this finding should be compared with analogous results in meta-analyses of memory for information that is congruent versus incongruent with expectancies. Specifically, in Stangor and McMillan's (1992) meta-analysis, the uncorrected recognition measures produced much better memory for expectancy-congruent information, d + = 0.63, whereas the recognition sensitivity measures produced considerably better memory for expectancy-incongruent information, d + = -0.44. The corresponding d + values from Rojahn and Pettigrew's (1992) meta-analysis of this same literature were 0.64 and -0.59. These findings suggest that an expectancy-consistent guessing strategy was manifested on the uncorrected measures, even though preferential encoding of the expectancy-inconsistent information was demonstrated by the recognition sensitivity measures.
Although these findings concerning the impact of information's consistency with expectancies seem understandable in view of the inherent reasonableness of guessing in line with one's expectancies, guessing in line with one's attitudes seems less likely. Supporting this reasoning, the difference in the effects produced by the uncorrected recognition measures and the recognition sensitivity measures was far smaller in the present synthesis than in the meta-analyses by Stangor and McMillan (1992) and Rojahn and Pettigrew (1992) . Nonetheless, this small tendency for the uncorrected recognition measures to yield a stronger congeniality effect than the recognition sensitivity measures invites interpretation.
Perhaps wishful thinking caused participants to slightly favor guesses in line with their attitudes (McGuire & McGuire, 1991) , or participants' use of their prior attitude as a memory heuristic might have produced some tendency toward attitude-consistent guessing. Alternatively, the subjective experience of recognizing information that is compatible with one's preferred attitudinal position might be attributed to its truth value. These possibilities are worthy of investigation.
The classification of effect sizes by type of memory measure potentially allowed us to examine the extent to which encoding or retrieval processes mediate attitudes' effects on memory. Whereas free-recall measures are held to assess the ability to retrieve information from memory, recognition measures are held to assess whether information has been encoded at all (e.g., Srull, 1984) . Because the mean effect sizes for recall (excluding the early studies whose coding was not known to be blind) and recognition sensitivity did not differ from one another, neither encoding nor retrieval processes are especially implicated by this analysis.
Finally, with respect to the distinction between explicit or direct and implicit or indirect measures of memory (e.g., Jacoby, Toth, Lindsay, & Debner, 1992; Schacter, 1987) , it is important to note that in every study included in the synthesis, memory was assessed by direct measures-that is, by asking participants to consciously remember attitude-relevant information that had previously been presented. In no case was memory assessed by indirect measures that left participants unaware that their memory was being assessed and that thus evaluated the effects of prior learning on subsequent responding in the absence of conscious recollection of this learning. Both implicit and explicit memory measures should be used in subsequent work not only because of the significance of this implicit-explicit distinction for understanding underlying cognitive processes, but also because of the relevance of the distinction to ecological validity. Thus, the attitude-relevant information that comes to mind in everyday situations is most germane to understanding attitudes' impact on memory. This is not to suggest that deliberate attempts to retrieve and ponder what one can recollect about an attitudinal issue are unimportant. To balance the picture, however, investigators ought to consider the role that prior 
Effects of Publication Year
Consistent with past speculations (e.g., Greenwald, 1975) , the congeniality effect decreased in magnitude over the decades during which attitude memory research was conducted. Because this erosion could have been mediated by changes in the way that memory was assessed, the continuous model for publication year was also calculated within types of measures. When the possibly artifactual effect sizes from the early studies whose coding was not h 1 = other, 0 = United States. ' Significance indicates model not correctly specified. j Birge ratio (see Hedges, 1994) . t/>< .10 (marginally significant). ** p < .01. ***/><.001. known to be blind were removed from the set of recall measures, the relation of the effect sizes to publication year became smaller and only marginally significant, because these deleted effect sizes were especially large. Similarly, measurement artifact might account for the tendency for effect sizes based on recognition measures to decrease over time. To examine this possibility, we removed the recognition sensitivity measures, which produced smaller effect sizes; these more valid measures tended to occur in more recent studies. If the temporal weakening of the congeniality effect stems in part from earlier studies' somewhat inflated uncorrected recognition measures, removal of the later studies' recognition sensitivity measures would attenuate the secular trend. Indeed, the trend did weaken, although it remained significant: In general, methodological weaknesses in the measurement of memory apparently accounted for a portion of the decline of the congeniality effect over time, although the recall measures provided stronger evidence for this conclusion than the recognition measures.
In contrast to this success in showing that measurement artifact likely mediated the weakening of the congeniality effect, there was no evidence that the decline over time was due to a tendency for recent studies to feature more controversial issues. In addition, the secular trend was not accomplished mainly by the addition of countercongeniality effects to the set of effect sizes. On the contrary, since the late 1960s, large positive effects and large negative effects became somewhat rarer, as the effects converged on a null value. This tendency was informed by the finding that a continuous model for year of publication showed as strong a secular trend when calculated on the absolute value of the effect sizes as it did when calculated on the signed effect sizes. Consistent with Greenwald's (1975) argument, one reasonable interpretation of these trends is that the true mean value of the congeniality effect in this research literature is null; as methods became more refined, experiments approached this outcome.
Effects of Characteristics of Attitudinal Issue
The several variables representing the characteristics of the attitudinal issue produced mixed results. The larger congeniality effect for highly value-relevant issues is consistent with our hypothesis that value relevance enhances defense motivation, if it is Note. Effect sizes are positive for superior memory for congenial information and negative for superior memory for uncongenial information. also assumed that defense motivation is often served by passive information-processing strategies that would enhance congeniality effects. However, the modest size of value relevance's moderation of the congeniality effect is not incompatible with our argument that heightened defense motivation is also capable of producing active processing that would tend to improve memory for uncongenial information. This reasoning about active attitudinal defense is compatible with the categorical model examining moderation by the controversiality of the attitudinal issue. Consistent with the argument that highly controversial issues are associated with bipolar attitude structures and that bipolarity facilitates storage of uncongenial information and fosters active counterarguing of it, the congeniality effect was smaller for controversial issues, although this moderation became nonsignificant when the recognition measures were examined separately and was not preserved in the multiple regression model.
Complicating the interpretation of both value relevance and controversiality is the covariation of these two variables and their consequent tendency to suppress each other's effects; it is not surprising that more controversial issues such as abortion and the war in Vietnam tended to be value relevant. Consequently, in the multiple regression models, the effect of value relevance was weakened by the inclusion of controversiality in the equation. Issue controversiality warrants further evaluation as an antecedent of bipolarity, because its validity as an index of bipolarity rests mainly on Pratkanis's (1984 Pratkanis's ( /1985 Pratkanis's ( , 1989 research (see introduction). Moreover, controversiality no doubt represents only one of the multiple determinants of the extent to which people attend to, learn, and store information on both sides of attitudinal issues. These effects might have been clarified in this meta-analysis if it had been possible to obtain direct measures of the bipolarity versus unipolarity of attitude structures or of the tendency to use active versus passive processing. Because our associated primary research on attitude memory using the highly controversial issues of abortion and gays in the military found that participants engaged in thoughtful counterarguing of uncongenial messages and remembered them to the extent that they engaged in this active process, assessment of active versus passive processing is critical in future research. However, this subsequent research failed to find effects of bipolarity using direct assessments of the extent to which participants had prior knowledge of proattitudinal versus counterattitudinal arguments.
Results for the impact of outcome relevance were equivocal. Consistent with the assumption that this form of involvement would foster accuracy-oriented processing and therefore would dampen the tendency to better recall congenial information, high outcome relevance was associated with a weaker congeniality effect. However, this effect proved to be nonsignificant on the recognition measures as well as in the multiple regression model.
Effects of Timing of Memory Measure
Confirming Roberts's (1985) finding, the expected tendency was obtained for the congeniality effect to be larger on delayed measures, defined as measures administered in a session subsequent to the stimulus exposure. However, our confidence in any overall tendency for congeniality to increase with delay was lessened by the failure of the congeniality effect to increase with the number of minutes that memory measurement was delayed within the stimulus exposure session or with the number of days that elapsed before the delayed measurement session. Also, the congeniality bias did not increase with the presence of interpolated activity before memory was assessed in the immediate session. Our confidence concerning the effects of delay was also lessened by the nonsignificance in the multiple regression model of the immediate versus delayed timing of memory measurement, defined as occurring in the stimulus exposure session versus a subsequent session, and by the lack of moderation of the congeniality effect by a 2-week delay of measurement in our associated primary research . Finally, the failure of the model for immediate versus delayed timing of memory measurement to be significant on the recall measures raises questions about Roberts's (1985) argument that a greater congeniality effect on delayed memory measures implicated retrieval (or reconstructive) processes, as opposed to encoding processes, as the more important determinant of attitude congeniality effects. Because encoding processes should be better assessed by recognition measures and retrieval processes by recall measures, Roberts's argument suggests that the delay effect that he and we observed on an overall basis ought to have held more strongly for recall than recognition measures-indeed, the reverse of what we found. Whether the attitude congeniality effect is more pronounced as time goes by and whether such a tendency interacts with type of memory measure remain worthy issues for research, because of their importance in explicating the cognitive processes that underlie attitude memory effects.
Effects of Nation Where Study Was Conducted
Difficult to interpret is the greater magnitude of the congeniality effect in studies conducted in nations other than the United States. Our inability to identify any study characteristics that explained the impact of this variable on the effect sizes suggested that the foreign studies represented methodologies that were not discernibly different from those of the U.S. studies. Awkward from the point of view of cultural explanations of this result is the tendency for the Canadian studies to cluster with the other foreign studies rather than the American studies. Although the United States has been described as more individualist in cultural orientation than Canada, the two nations are regarded as resembling one another more than either resembles any other nation (Lipset, 1990) . In addition, of the foreign nations in our synthesis-Canada, Germany, Great Britain, India, and New Zealand-only India would typically be labeled collectivist by cross-cultural psychologists (e.g., Triandis, 1995) .
Our quantitative synthesis is not the first to produce stronger findings in studies conducted in foreign nations. In Bond and Smith's (1996) meta-analysis, which produced smaller conformity effects in individualist than collectivist nations, U.S. studies produced a smaller average conformity effect than non-U.S. studies, including Canada (R. Bond, personal communication, March 31, 1997) . In addition, Wood, Lundgren, Ouellette, Busceme, and Blackstone's (1994) synthesis of minority influence experiments established that the European initiators of this research paradigm (e.g., S. Moscovici, G. Mugny) produced stronger evidence for hypothesized minority influence effects than did other researchers, most of whom conducted their research in the United States. However, effects of nation cannot generally be accounted for by the principle that effects are larger where research paradigms originate because investigators in the United States initiated research on conformity and the attitude-memory relation. Although neither we nor the authors of these other two meta-analyses identified methodological characteristics that accounted for observed nations effects, the question of whether research practices differ between nations warrants attention.
Because the broad distinction between individualism and collectivism (Triandis, 1995) proved useful in accounting for crossnational effects in Bond and Smith's (1996) synthesis of conformity studies, we scored the countries represented in the attitude memory literature on individualism-collectivism using Hofstede's (1980) values. Although the tendency was significant for the congeniality effect to be smaller in more individualist countries, adding this individualism-versus-collectivism variable to the multiple regression model only slightly reduced the prediction of the effect sizes by the nation variable. Moreover, individualism versus collectivism was not itself significant in the model. A different cultural explanation invokes possible differences in journalistic and other media practices to explain the tendencies for the congeniality effect to be weaker in the United States as well as to decline over the decades of attitude memory research. Distinctive in the United States in recent decades is the emphasis placed on balanced media coverage of controversial social issues, a style often known as objective journalism (DeFieur & Dennis, 1991) . This style includes an emphasis on giving both sides of a controversy an opportunity to present their arguments and framing stories in an emotionally detached manner. Although objective journalism met with criticism in the 1960s in particular (Schudson, 1995) , the style continues to predominate. In fact, the Society of Professional Journalists includes in its Code of Ethics the statement that, "News reports should be free of opinion or bias and represent all sides of an issue" (Applegate, 1996, p. 115) . To the extent that the news and other media coverage of social and political issues are more balanced in the United States than in foreign countries, especially in recent years, both the nations effect and the year-of-publication effect might be explained at least in part in terms of an increasing tendency for U.S. citizens' attitudes to be more bipolar in structure, because of frequent exposure to both pro and con sides of controversial attitudinal issues. Unfortunately, quantitative information suitable for evaluating this argument was not available. Addressing these issues systematically would require comparative studies of media coverage and its impact on attitude structure.
Other Moderators
The larger congeniality effect associated with studies yielding an error term that was based on within-subjects or mixed variability, compared with between-subjects variability, lends itself to two possible interpretations. One interpretation is that within-subjects designs provided a more precise error term because participants served as their own controls. Indeed, larger effects have been found in other meta-analyses for within-subjects than betweensubjects designs (e.g., Eagly, Ashmore, Makhijani, & Longo, 1991) . A second interpretation is that exposure to both congenial and uncongenial information may favor congeniality because presentation of only one side of an issue may produce a demand to pay attention, regardless of congeniality, whereas presentation of both sides of an issue allows congenial and uncongenial information to compete for attention and processing capacity. Because our associated primary research obtained a null congeniality effect for a within-subjects manipulation of congeniality as well as between-subjects manipulations, we favor the first interpretation, which implicates statistical precision.
The tendency for the congeniality effect to be larger in journal articles than in dissertations and other unpublished documents is typical of meta-analytic findings (e.g., Lipsey & Wilson, 1993) . Research on publication bias has consistently shown that studies with positive, statistically significant results are more likely to be published (see review by Begg, 1994) . This bias arises from the dampening of authors' intentions to publish when their findings turn out to be null or contrary to established hypotheses (Greenwald, 1975; Rotton, Foos, Van Meek, & Levitt, 1995) . Evidence for publication bias in research literatures underscores the desirability of including unpublished studies in quantitative syntheses.
This meta-analysis appropriately included as many such studies as could be located: The 20 studies (29% of the total) from dissertations, master's theses, or other unpublished documents produced a modest downward correction of the mean effect size.
Notable Nonconfirmations of Hypotheses
A number of potential moderators of attitude-memory effects did not prove to be potent. In particular, the absence of a relation between the congeniality bias and the extent to which congenial information was more familiar than uncongenial information coheres with the null findings of the few experiments that explicitly examined this potential confound (e.g., Greenwald & Sakumura, 1967; Zimmerman & Chaiken, 1996) . Because it seems obvious that prior familiarity with congenial information should enhance its memorability, an opposing tendency for novel information to be better remembered may have conspired to produce our null finding for the familiarity variable. If this reasoning is correct, subsequent researchers should take the familiarity of their congenial and uncongenial information into account and strive to equate the two types of information on this dimension.
This synthesis also obtained little evidence that the congeniality effect receded to the extent that various cues promoted participants' processing of attitudinally incongruent information or, more generally, promoted or suppressed processing of all attituderelevant information. There was some evidence that outcome relevance, the motivational variable we thought would enhance objective information processing (B. T. Johnson & Eagly, 1989) , often attenuated the congeniality effect. Nonetheless, despite wide variation in the experimental instructions that participants received, these did not covary with the effect sizes, regardless of whether we coded them in a detailed way or divided them according to whether they explicitly instructed participants to learn or memorize information. Because many of the instructional sets that did not favor intentional learning (e.g., judging the effectiveness of persuasive arguments) could easily have induced participants to focus on uncongenial information to the same extent as congenial information, the failure to document a smaller congeniality effect for studies featuring intentional learning instructions did not, in retrospect, surprise us. Rather than dismissing the potential moderating role of instructional sets or motivational goals, we urge greater attention to them in subsequent attitude memory research. Particularly encouraging are studies suggesting that enhanced defense motivation, whether manipulated (Zimmerman & Chaiken, 1996) or assessed through individual differences such as dogmatism (Kleck & Wheaton, 1967; Rokeach, 1960) , may increase attitudes' impact on memory and that this increase may promote greater memory for incongruent information when active rather than passive strategies for defending attitudes are used (e.g., by sensitizers vs. repressers, Olson, 1980 ; see also Zimmerman & Chaiken, 1996) .
Conclusion
When viewing the results of this meta-analysis solely in terms of the magnitude of the attitude congeniality effect it obtained, psychologists might make the mistake of concluding, in line with informal characterizations of this literature (e.g., Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975; Greenwald, 1975) , that attitudes exert little, if any, impact on memory for attitude-relevant information. Nonetheless, with respect to the issue of effect magnitude, our synthesis went far beyond the mere recognition that the congeniality effect is generally small because it revealed that this effect grew smaller (a) when methodologically suspect data sets were removed, (b) when studies using more accurate recognition-sensitivity measures of recognition memory were isolated, and (c) when research progressed from early to contemporary times. When these moderating conditions are taken into account, the tendency for attitudes to bias memory in a congenial direction warrants description as extremely small or even as null. Moreover, our associated experiments that were designed to model prototypical attitude memory experiments obtained null congeniality effects under a fairly wide range of conditions . However, these findings do not support a broader verdict that attitudes exert little or no influence on memory for attitude-relevant information.
If attitudes have no effect on memory, empirical efforts to predict variation in the size of the attitude congeniality effect ought to have been unsuccessful. Yet, this synthesis detected reliable moderator variables, above and beyond those moderators that are interpretable in terms of measurement artifact contaminating a portion of the studies. Moderators such as value relevance and controversiality produced theoretically meaningful variation in attitudes' effects on memory, and one not easily interpreted moderator-the nation in which studies were conducted-raised new questions about the mechanisms by which attitudes affect memory. Moreover, a great deal of systematic variation remained unexplained, in large part because many theoretically important moderators of the attitude-memory relation could not be assessed meta-analytically. These considerations suggest the value of renewed attention to this research area.
Investigators' attention could usefully be directed to motivational and structural moderators that this synthesis could not represent. Regarding motivational moderators, explicit attention to factors that motivate defensive processing of attitude-relevant information is called for. Moreover, it is also critical for research to ascertain the extent to which defensive processing is active in the sense that people attend to uncongenial information in order to counterargue it. Such processing would still be in the defense of attitudes but could manifest itself, at least on immediate measures of memory, in the absence of a congeniality effect or even, under some circumstances, a reversal of the congeniality effect (Zimmerman & Chaiken, 1996) .
Regarding attitude structure as a moderator of attitudes' effects on memory, possessing a coherent set of attitude-congruent beliefs should enable people to challenge uncongenial information, at least when they are sufficiently motivated to defend their attitudes. Also, despite the inability of this synthesis to produce a strong test of the hypothesis that a bipolar attitude structure dampens the congeniality effect, experimental tests of this hypothesis may lend it support and thus advance understanding of how attitude structure can foster memory for both uncongenial and congenial information. In this regard, our auxiliary synthesis of the handful of studies that contrasted participants' memory for extreme versus moderate information revealed that extreme information was better remembered, a finding compatible with our bipolarity logic and Judd and Kulik's (1980) conceptualization of attitudes as bipolar schemas.
Additional aspects of attitude structure should be addressed in primary research. In particular, Zimmerman and Chaiken's (1996) research points to the importance of taking into account whether attitudes are based mainly on cognitions (higher evaluativecognitive consistency) or mainly on affect (higher evaluativeaffective consistency). In fact, their findings that cognitively based attitudes produced an incongruency effect on immediate memory whereas affectively based attitudes produced a congruency effect were replicated in a recent study conducted after the cutoff of our literature search (Duckworth & Chaiken, 1998) . In addition, this study found that having participants focus on their cognitions toward the target issue produced an incongruency effect, whereas having them focus on their feelings produced a congruency effect. These studies indicate that the direction of attitudes' impact on memory depends on particular aspects of available and accessible intra-attitudinal structure. It is clear that other important conceptions of attitude structure and attitude strength that have not been examined in the attitude memory literature (e.g., accessibility, working knowledge) deserve attention.
Despite the importance of the moderators that this meta-analysis uncovered and the likely importance of moderators that are yet to be investigated, it is extremely unlikely that subsequent research will change the central tendency in this research literature by demonstrating a strong and consistent tendency for attitudes to bias memory in a congenial direction. Insofar as new research is able to clarify factors that promote better memory for information that is congenial, uncongenial, or extreme, concentration on the classic congeniality effect should decline, and the general power of attitudes to influence memory in a variety of ways should be better appreciated. Yet, the one-sided focus of past researchers on producing a congeniality effect is understandable in view of initial theorizing about attitude memory and early findings that seemed highly supportive of this theorizing, especially Levine and Murphy's (1943) dramatic results. In view of the subsequent literature and the circumstantial evidence provided by this meta-analysis, Levine and Murphy's findings were very likely in error. Unfortunately, these findings fostered the expectation of a strong and robust congeniality effect and set the tone of several decades of experimentation.
In addition to recognizing that attitudes have different kinds of impact on memory and examining the motivational and structural variables that produce these varying outcomes, investigators should address the processes that underlie these outcomes. Processes such as attention and elaboration that may mediate memory effects have not been directly examined in prior research but emerged as critical mediators of memory for uncongenial messages in our associated primary research . As theorizing about attitude memory effects grows more sophisticated, studies will need to incorporate measures of potential mediating processes and manipulations designed to influence these processes.
Questions concerning the measures used to assess memory and the timing of these measurements, although not resolved by this synthesis, emerged as important. In particular, more research using recognition-sensitivity measures is called for given that this class of measures, culled from only a few studies, produced null effects. Also, memory measures that are implicit as well as explicit should be used in subsequent work, because of the significance of this implicit-explicit distinction for understanding underlying cognitive processes. Primary research that explicitly contrasts the direction and magnitude of attitude memory effects across different types of memory measures should help disentangle the role of encoding and retrieval processes.
In closing, we reiterate the major implication of our findingsnamely, that attitudes exert a variety of effects on memory. This quantitative synthesis has shed light on some of the factors and mechanisms that produce these effects. Consistent with Eagly and Wood's (1994) view that meta-analyses are generally a way station where analysts sift and evaluate evidence as they proceed toward more thorough understanding of a particular relation, our empirical findings and theoretical analysis show that this research area continues to provide exciting opportunities for developing empirical and theoretical knowledge about the functioning of attitudes.
